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STATE v. STANLEY
EXCLUSION OF STATEMENTS MADE BY
ILLEGALLY "SEIZED" SUSPECTS
I. INTRODUCTION
The United States Supreme Court has focused much of its attention in the
last two decades on the administration of criminal justice. In at least two areas,
the Court has directly influenced the manner in which the criminal law is en-
forced. In its search and seizure and its confession decisions, the Court has
made direct demands upon law enforcement officers to comply with procedural
safeguards for the protection of the basic constitutional rights of the individual
citizen in his confrontations with the law.1
In the search and seizure and confession areas the sanction provided by
the Court has been the same: exclusion of evidence secured in violation of its
mandates.2 Although at first those mandates focused primarily on the defen-
dant's fifth amendment3 right against self-incrimination, the focus shifted to
the accused's rights under the fourth amendment" ban against an unreasonable
search or seizure. When the defendant in a criminal case shows that evidence
against him was obtained through the exploitation of an illegal search or
seizure, the exclusionary rule requires that such evidence be suppressed.5
The Court has further defined and expanded the protections afforded the
accused in rulings handed down since its landmark decisions of the 1960s.6 The
West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals has strived to protect individual
rights in accordance with those decisions. The 1981 case of State v. Stanley7
presented the court with the opportunity to tailor the state's law on seizures,
1 V. BRODERICK, CRIMINAL DEFENSE TECHNIQUES § 3.01 (1982).
'"The [exclusionary] rule is calculated to prevent, not to repair. Its purpose is to deter - to
compel respect for the constitutional guaranty in the only effectively available way - by removing
the incentive to disregard it." Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960).
8 No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on
a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval
forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public danger; nor shall
any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor
shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law, nor shall private property be,
taken for public use, without just compensation.
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
' The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CoNsT. amend. IV.
5 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (exclusionary rule applicable to the states through the
fourteenth amendment); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914) (exclusionary rule applicable
to federal prosecutions).
I See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964);
Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963).
7 284 S.E.2d 367 (W. Va. 1981).
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confessions and Miranda warnings.' A voluntary detention which evolved into
a "seizure" was held to be the basis for the exclusion of the appellant's later
confession because the causal connection between the arrest and the confession
had not been broken." Furthermore, protection of the appellant's fifth amend-
ment rights, through the giving of Miranda warnings, was held to be insuffi-
cient to free the statement from the "taint of illegal police conduct."'1
II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The appellant, Mary Jo Stanley, fatally shot her father in the back of the
head as he was beating her mother. The two women put the body in the family
car and drove it out of town. By taking the victim's watch and ring, they hoped
to make it appear that a robbery and murder had occurred. After returning to
their house in another car, they called the police to make a missing person
report. Two days later the Wayne County Sheriff's Department discovered the
body in the car and notified the Huntington Police Department. An officer first
talked with the victim's family on that date.
Five days later the officer returned to the victim's house and asked the
appellant, her mother and children to come to the police department to assist
in giving information about the victim. They consented, arriving at the station
at 4 p.m. Each family member was given Miranda warnings before interroga-
tion; they also signed waivers after tape-recorded statements. After the appel-
lant's daughter and mother were questioned, the appellant was questioned.
Her son was then questioned and, at about 11 p.m., she was interrogated again.
During the final interrogation she admitted on tape that she had shot her fa-
ther. Arrest warrants were then obtained for the appellant, her mother and her
son.
11
The trial court held that initially the appellant and her family were not
deprived of their freedom of action in any significant way and were not abused,
threatened or promised leniency. And, although it found that probable cause to
arrest the appellant did not exist until after her statement was given, the court
admitted the confession into evidence at trial. Stanley was convicted of second
degree murder 2 in the Cabell County Circuit Court.13
In reversing the lower court, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals
held that the appellant had been "seized" because she was not free to leave
police headquarters after her son was questioned. Therefore, it reasoned, her
8 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), held that a defendant subjected to "custodial inter-
rogation" has the right to the presence of counsel during such interrogation and the right to be
informed of both his right to counsel and his right to remain silent.
I Stanley, 284 S.E.2d at 370.
10 Id.
" 284 S.E.2d at 368-69.
2 "Murder by poison, lying in wait, imprisonment, starving, or by any wilful, deliberate and
premeditated killing, or in the commission of, or attempt to commit arson, rape, robbery or bur-
glary, is murder of the first degree. All other murder is murder of the second degree." W. VA. CODe
§ 61-2-1 (1977).
23 284 S.E.2d at 368.
[Vol. 85
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subsequent confession was inadmissible because there were no intervening cir-
cumstances between the seizure and the confession to free her statement from
the taint of illegal police conduct.1 '
Additionally, the court held that a retrial of the appellant would not con-
stitute double jeopardy under the fifth amendment. Because the case was be-
ing reversed for constitutional error and not for insufficient evidence, the pros-
ecution was not barred from presenting alternative evidence to prove its case
at a second trial.15
III. PRIOR LAW
A. United States Supreme Court Decisions
The common law requirement of voluntariness formerly constituted the
primary limitation on the use of a defendant's incriminating statements at
trial.16 Voluntariness was determined by examining the totality of the circum-
stances; courts treated almost everything as relevant and nothing as control-
ling. Among the factors considered in determining the admissibility of a con-
fession under the voluntariness test were the duration of the interrogation, the
physical surroundings during the interrogation, whether the interrogator was
attempting to elicit a confession in accord with police preconceptions, whether
there was physical abuse or threats thereof, the health of the confessor, the
confessor's prior experience with the law, and an almost endless list of other
circumstances.1" The illegality of an arrest had been just one factor to consider
in determining the voluntariness of a statement. 8 A statement obtained during
custody following an unjustified arrest was not regarded as inadmissible by vir-
tue of the illegality of the detention alone.
Then, in 1963, the Supreme Court in Wong Sun v. United States" de-
clared that the fourth amendment requirement that a seizure of the person be
"reasonable" provided the basis for excluding statements obtained after an un-
reasonable arrest or detention. Much earlier the Supreme Court had ruled that
evidence seized during an unlawful search could not constitute proof against
the victim of the search.20 Later, the exclusionary prohibition had been ex-
tended to exclude any derivative evidence discovered by using knowledge
gained by the police through their illegal conduct.21 This derivative evidence
was dubbed the "fruit of the poisonous tree. '22 The primary evidence obtained
in the search is the poisonous tree and the derivative evidence its fruits.2
The Court in Wong Sun extended the "fruit of the poisonous tree" doc-
" Id. at 370.
15 Id.
'a C. McCoRMICK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF EvDENc. § 147, § 149 (2d ed. 1972).
17 Id. at § 149.
18 Dailey v. United States, 261 F.2d 870 (5th Cir. 1958).
1" Wong Sun, 371 U.S. 471 (1963).
20 Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920).
11 Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338 (1939).
12 Id. at 341.
23W. RINmEL, SEARCHES & SEizuREs, ARRESTS AND CONFESSIONS § 3.2 (2d ed. 1981).
19831
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trine beyond the traditional seizure of "papers and effects" to verbal state-
ments obtained as a result of unlawful police action. The Court held that "ver-
bal evidence which derives so immediately from an unlawful entry and an
unauthorized arrest. . . is no less the 'fruit' of official illegality than the more
common tangible fruits of the unwarranted intrusion,' '1 4 and is thus
inadmissible.
Despite Wong Sun's holding that the government could not exploit the
illegality of an arrest, the decision left the basic law relating to the admissibil-
ity of confessions unchanged.2 5 The question upon challenge still was simply
whether the statement offered was voluntary. Wong Sun merely added the
causation factor: even though a confession made during an illegal detention is
found to be voluntary, the confession is inadmissible if the illegal detention
was an operative factor in causing it.26 The next year the Supreme Court, in
Jackson v. Denno,2 7 prescribed the courtroom procedures which must be fol-
lowed in determining the admissibility of any confession.
It was not until the 1966 decision of Miranda v. Arizona2' that the privi-
lege against compulsory self-incrimination was used to protect a person facing
police interrogation. For the first time, the court expressly declared that fifth
amendment protection against self-incrimination was required in state custo-
dial interrogations 29 and that an accused's statements might be excluded at
trial despite their voluntary character under traditional principles.3 0
After Wong Sun and Miranda, some courts incorrectly construed the in-
terrelationship of the fourth and fifth amendment principles announced in the
two cases.31 Some reasoned that the giving of Miranda warnings was sufficient
to "purge the taint" of the illegality. Because of its concern with such a holding
by the Supreme Court of Illinois 2 the United States Supreme Court granted
certiorari in Brown v. Illinois3 3 in 1975.
The United States Supreme Court held the Illinois court had erred in
24 Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 485 (1963).
2' Ryon v. State, 29 Md. App. 62, 349 A.2d 393, 396 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1975), afl'd, 32 Md.
App. 529, 363 A.2d 243 (1976).
2'6 State v. Traub, 151 Conn. 246, 249-50, 1.96 A.2d 755, 757 (1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 960
(1964). In Wong Sun, the illegal custody of one defendant had terminated and his statement was
obtained several days later during voluntary interrogation. His statement was held not to be the
fruit of the arrest because "the connection between the arrest and the statement had 'become so
attenuated as to dissipate the taint."' 371 U.S. at 491 (quoting Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S.
338, 341).
27 378 U.S. 368 (1964). The question of the voluntariness of a confession must be decided by
the court, not the jury.
28 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
2' Prior to Miranda, the Court's attention in reviewing involuntary confessions was directed to
due process in the context of the trial. Miranda redirected the Court's focus to stationhouse pro-
cess. BRODERICK, supra note 1, at § 3.02.
30 384 U.S. at 457.
S E.g., People v. Robinson, 45 A.D.2d 909, 909-10, 358 N.Y.S.2d 230, 231-32 (1974); Murray v.
State, 505 S.W.2d 589, 592 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974).
32 Brown v. Illinois, 56 IM. 2d 312, 307 N.E.2d 356 (1974), rev'd, 422 U.S. 590 (1975).
33 422 U.S. 590, 597 (1975).
[Vol. 85
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adopting a per se rule that Miranda warnings in and of themselves break the
causal connection between illegal arrests and subsequent statements.3 ' Even if
statements are found to be voluntary under the fifth amendment, the Court
stressed, the fourth amendment issue remains.35 The Wong Sun causation re-
quirement means that the statement must not only "meet the fifth amendment
standard of voluntariness, but that it [also] be 'sufficiently an act of free will to
purge the primary taint.' 386
The Court rejected the Illinois court's per se rule and declined to adopt
any alternative per se or "but for" rule to apply in such cases. 7 Instead, the
Court explained that the question of whether a confession is the product of
free will under Wong Sun should be answered on the facts of each case, with
no single fact being dispositive.3' While acknowledging that voluntariness is a
threshold requirement and that Miranda warnings are an important element,
the Brown decision listed other relevant factors to consider: the temporal prox-
imity of the arrest and the confession, the presence of intervening circum-
stances and, particularly, the purpose and flagrancy of the official
misconduct.39
Four years after Brown, the Court ruled that its fourth amendment pro-
tections applied equally to illegal seizures or detentions that do not amount to
formal arrests. The court in Dunaway v. New York"0 held that, except for the
"stop and frisk exception,' 1 the fourth amendment requires probable cause
for intrusions upon the liberties of individuals even when a formal arrest has
not been made.
The Court explained that detention for custodial interrogation, regardless
of its label, intrudes so severely on interests protected by the fourth amend-
ment that the traditional safeguards against illegal arrest must apply.42 In ad-
dition, Dunaway reaffirmed the holding in Brown that Miranda warnings do
not, without more, dissipate the taint of an illegal arrest.
4 3
Thus, an examination of the United States Supreme Court's decisions
shows the evolution of the law in this area. While at first tangible evidence
seized during an unlawful search was excluded, the sanction was later extended
" Id. at 603.
35 Id. at 601-02.
36 Id. at 602 (quoting Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 486).
37 Id. at 603.
33 Id.
so Id. at 603-04.
40 422 U.S. 200 (1979). Dunaway was approached at his home, where he was asked to accom-
pany police to the police station for questioning. He consented and was taken to an interrogation
room where he was advised of his Miranda rights, which he waived. He later made inculpatory
statements and drawings. The Court ruled that the officers had no probable cause to arrest him
until he had made the statement.
41 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). Terry for the first time recognized an exception to the
requirement that fourth amendment seizures of persons must be based on probable cause. Officers
are allowed to "momentarily" detain an individual to clarify an ambiguous situation on the basis of
a reasonable suspicion, which is less than the usual requirement of probable cause.
4' 442 U.S. at 216.
43 Id. at 217.
1983]
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to verbal statements obtained as a result of unlawful police action. The first
cases dealing with the exclusion of verbal evidence were those in which the
defendant had been formally arrested without probable cause. Later, the exclu-
sion was held to also apply when a suspect had not been formally arrested, but
had, nevertheless, been "seized" by the police.
B. West Virginia Decisions
West Virginia's Supreme Court of Appeals has consistently attempted to
follow the principles emerging from these Supreme Court rulings.
In 1978, the West Virginia court was faced with determining whether a
confession induced by illegally seized evidence should be excluded as "fruit of
the poisonous tree." The decision in State v. Williams44 relied on Wong Sun
and held that the confession was a product of the exploitation of the illegally
seized evidence and therefore should be excluded.
4"
After deciding Williams, which dealt only with confessions made after evi-
dence had been illegally seized, the court had an opportunity in 1979 to con-
sider what effect an illegal arrest had on the admissibility of a subsequent oral
confession. In State v. Canby 46 the court, following the Supreme Court's rea-
soning in Brown, held that exclusion of a confession obtained as a result of an
illegal arrest without a warrant is mandated unless the causal connection be-
tween the arrest and the confession has been clearly broken.47 Additionally,
although the defendants in Canby had been given Miranda warnings, the court
held that the warnings alone did not negate causality.48
In 1980, the West Virginia court adhered to its Canby holding in State v.
Moore." The court excluded from evidence an object seized in an illegal search
and inculpatory statements made by the defendant after he was illegally ar-
rested. The court found the causal connection between the arrest and subse-
quent confession had not been broken."
While previous West Virginia decisions had dealt with confessions ob-
tained after traditional illegal arrests without a warrant (as in Brown), Stanley
presented the court with the opportunity to apply its rulings to a Dunaway
seizure situation.
IV. ANALYsIs
The opinion in State v. Stanley, written by Justice Neely, displays a
sound conclusion, considering the facts of the case. However, a more detailed
discussion of the reasoning the court used in reaching its decision would have
helped to guide lower courts and law enforcement officers in evaluating similar
4 249 S.E.2d 758 (W. Va. 1978).
45 Id. at 764.
4" 252 S.E.2d 164 (W. Va 1979).
47 Id. at 167.
48 Id.
4 272 S.E.2d 804 (W. Va. 1980).
50 Id. at 816.
[Vol. 85
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situations in the future.
In deciding first whether an illegal arrest had occurred, the court logically
concluded that, although the appellant had voluntarily gone to the police de-
partment, she was later "seized" when she was not free to leave or her liberty
was restrained.5 1 Apparently this conclusion was based upon four facts: 1) the
interrogation had become accusatory; 2) after the interrogation of her son, the
appellant was no longer free to leave; 3) the appellant's uncle, who came to the
station at midnight, was warned to leave; and 4) the appellant was never told
she was free to leave.
52
When viewed under definitions offered by other courts,53 these facts ade-
quately support the conclusion that Stanley was seized. The most frequent def-
inition cited is that in Terry v. Ohio: "whenever a police officer accosts an
individual and restrains his freedom to walk away, he has 'seized' that
person."
54
Justice Neely, although listing factors to support the conclusion, did not
explain how to determine when a seizure had occurred. Consequently, Stanley
provides lower courts and law enforcement officers with little guidance for such
determinations. Fortunately, though, the court may have somewhat cured this
deficiency in a subsequent 1982 decision.
In State v. Boswell,55 West Virginia rejected the seizure test enunciated by
the Supreme Court in United States v. Mendenhall.5 6 The Mendenhall Court
ruled that there has been a seizure when "in view of all the circumstances sur-
rounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he was
not free to leave. '57 In Boswell, Chief Justice Miller criticized this approach,
finding that the legality of the seizure of a person cannot be resolved on the
basis of a single factor. Instead, he reasoned, the "intensity of the initial in-
quiry"5 8 should determine whether the threshold of seizure had been crossed.
The less intense the initial inquiry, the less likely a seizure will be found.
Although West Virginia's court rejected Mendenhall's seizure test, its defi-
51 284 S.E.2d at 370.
52 Id. at 369.
"' Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967) (any conduct of a government agent or
official which intrudes upon a person's reasonable expectation of privacy is a search or seizure
under the fourth amendment); Arnold v. United States, 382 F.2d 4, 7 (9th Cir. 1967) (any exercise
of police restraint over a person's freedom of movement may constitute a "seizure" within the
fourth amendment, sustainable only if not unreasonable); State v. Stroud, 30 Wash. App. 392, 634
P.2d 316, 318 (1981) (there is a seizure for fourth amendment purposes "when in view of all cir-
cumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free
to leave"); People v. Privott, 66 A.D.2d 951, 411 N.Y.S.2d 711 (N.Y. App. Div. 1978) (for constitu-
tional purposes, a "seizure" of a person contemplates a significant interference with the person's
liberty of movement). Cf. Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492 (1977) (a person is not arrested under
the fourth amendment if he freely elects to enter into or continue an encounter with police).
392 U.S. 1, 16 (1968).
86 294 S.E.2d 287 (W. Va. 1982).
446 U.S. 544 (1980).
"Id. at 554.
58 294 S.E.2d at 294.
1983]
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nition of "intensity" somewhat parallels the characteristics of a seizure given
by the Mendenhall Court. The term "intensity," the court explained, is
designed to cover a variety of fact patterns which surround the initial inquiry
between the police and the individual. It embraces not only the degree of phys-
ical intrusion, but also more subtle means of coercion or intrusion, including
the number of officers involved, their demeanor, their conduct and the length
of time the suspect was questioned.5 9 Similarly, circumstances listed in Men-
denhall include "the threatening presence of several officers, the display of a
weapon by an officer, some physical touching of the person of the citizen, or
the use of language or tone of voice indicating that compliance might be
compelled."60
Although it could be argued that the Stanley court failed to sufficiently
define a seizure, the court did attempt to aid police faced with situations in
which guilty persons voluntarily accompany police in an effort to avert suspi-
cion from themselves. Concerned with the possibility that such persons could
later claim they were being held against their will, the court noted that police
should protect the record "by making it clear to those whom they are about to
interrogate that they are not under arrest and are free to leave." 1 It remains to
be seen, however, what effect such a warning actually will have upon a court's
determination of a seizure.
After determining that probable cause 2 for the arrest in Stanley did not
exist, the court applied factors enunciated by the Supreme Court to determine
whether Stanley's inculpatory statements were sufficiently a product of her
free will to be admissible under the fourth amendment. Although not expressly
stated, the opinion suggests that the court first considered the threshold ques-
tion of the voluntariness of the confession. The court noted that "appellant
and her family were not physically abused, threatened or promised leniency." 3
A second factor relevant to an inquiry of whether a confession is a result
of the exploitation of an illegal arrest is the use of Miranda warnings. Each
member of the Stanley family was given the warning before interrogation. As
in Brown and Dunaway, however, the court held that the giving of Miranda
warnings alone is not enough to break the causal connection between the illegal
arrest and the confession." This reasoning is sound, since Miranda warnings in
"I Id.
40 446 U.S. at 554.
11 284 S.E.2d at 369. The Dunaway Court also noted that the defendant was not told he was
"free to go." 442 U.S. at 212.
42 "Probable cause to make an arrest without a warrant exists when the facts and the circum-
stances within the knowledge of the arresting officers are sufficient to warrant a prudent man in
believing that an offense has been committed or is being committed." State v. Plantz, 155 W. Va.
24, 180 S.E.2d 614 (1971).
63 284 S.E.2d at 369.
" Id. at 368. The 1980 decision in State v. Moore had explained the policies underlying this
determination. Quoting from Brown, the West Virginia court there reasoned that if Miranda warn-
ings, by themselves, were held to attenuate the taint of an unconstitutional arrest, the effect of the
exclusionary rule would be substantially diluted. 272 S.E.2d at 816. Fearful that police could ob-
tain admissible evidence by simply giving Miranda warnings, the court noted that "any incentive
to avoid Fourth Amendment violations would be eviscerated by making the warnings, in effect, a
[Vol. 85
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no way inform a person of fourth amendment rights, including the right to be
released from unlawful custody following an arrest made without a warrant or
without probable cause.6 5
Other factors relevant in determining the effect of police misconduct (de-
rived from the Brown and Dunaway decisions), are the temporal proximity of
the arrest and the confession, the presence of intervening circumstances and,
particularly, the purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct." The Stan-
ley court did not expressly apply these factors to the case at bar; instead, it
simply concluded that "no intervening circumstances between the illegal
seizure of the appellant and her subsequent statement would free that state-
ment from the taint of illegal police conduct."67
The United States Supreme Court has found such a limited inquiry insuf-
ficient. No single factor is sufficient to show the nexus between an illegal arrest
and subsequent confession. Instead, a court must view the totality of the cir-
cumstances to determine whether the attenuation of the taint in a particular
case is sufficient to permit the use of the challenged evidence.6 8 More specifi-
cally, the Court's language in Brown is clear that the "purpose and flagrancy of
the misconduct" is "particularly" relevant. The Stanley court's failure to con-
sider this factor, while not crucial to the case at bar, leaves unclear what
weight was assigned to it. Consequently, lower courts are left without proper
guidance as to the weight and relevancy of each factor in evaluating the admis-
sibility of confessions made after other types of illegal arrests.
In conducting the attenuation analysis, the Supreme Court has empha-
sized that courts must weigh the circumstances of each case in light of the
policies served by the exclusionary rule.69 At some point, society's interest in
criminal conviction will outweigh the value of deterring police misconduct. In
those cases, the exclusion of a confession ceases to further the deterrence
policy.
70
For example, when police misconduct is flagrant and committed with the
purpose of abridging a suspect's rights, use of the exclusionary remedy as a
deterrent is most appropriate. 1 Conversely, when the violation is technical72 or
'cure-all.'" Id. at 816.
63 Brown, 422 U.S. at 601, n.6.
66 Id. at 603-04.
67 284 S.E.2d at 370.
es United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268 (1978).
Il See, e.g., Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978); United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268
(1978); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976); Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590 (1975); United States
v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974).
70 Comment, The Fourth Amendment and Tainted Confessions: Admissibility as a Policy
Decision, 13 Hous. L. REv. 753, 771 (1976); Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 608-12 (1975) (Powell,
J., concurring in part).
71 In Brown, two detectives of the Chicago police force broke into Brown's apartment and
searched it. When Brown entered the apartment, he was told that he was under arrest, was held at
gunpoint and was searched. He then was handcuffed and escorted to the squad car that eventually
took him to the police station for interrogation. The Supreme Court placed emphasis on the fact
that: "the arrest, both in design and in execution, was investigatory. The detectives embarked
upon this expedition for evidence in the hope that something might turn up. The manner in which
1983]
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occurs in good faith, deterrence is not needed and there is less need to invoke
the rule.
73
"The deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rule necessarily assumes that
the police have engaged in wilful, or at least very negligent, conduct which has
deprived the defendant of some right. '74 Thus, in cases in which this underly-
ing premise is missing, the deterrence objective of the rule would not be
served. While the West Virginia court may have reached the proper conclusion
in Stanley, a more detailed discussion of the weight of all the Brown factors,
particularly that of "purpose and flagrancy," would aid in determining when
the exclusionary rule should be invoked.
In a secondary issue, the Stanley court examined and reaffirmed 5 one as-
pect of West Virginia's law on double jeopardy.76 Since Stanley's conviction
was overturned 77 only because part of the State's case (the confession) was
found to be inadmissible, the court held that a second trial would not violate
the double jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment. 8 Conversely, the court
noted, if the State had presented insufficient evidence to convict, it would not
be given a second chance to mount evidence against the appellant.79
This holding is consistent with previous rulings of the West Virginia court
and of the Supreme Court,80 which have distinguished between reversal for evi-
dentiary insufficiency and reversal for trial error. Essentially, they reason that
reversal for trial error does not imply that the government has failed to prove
its case. "Rather, it is a determination that a defendant has been convicted
through a judicial process which is defective in some fundamental respect, e.g.,
incorrect receipt or rejection of evidence ... .
Thus, if a case is reversed for trial error, the State should not be foreclosed
from a chance to correct its error.8 2 In balancing the defendant's rights and the
state's interest in law enforcement, the defendant's rights will be sufficiently
protected on retrial, since the tainted evidence will be excluded.
Relying on State v. Frazier, the Stanley court ruled that the determina-
Brown's arrest was effected gives the appearance of having been calculated to cause surprise,
fright, and confusion." 422 U.S. at 605.
72 Justice Powell, in his concurrence in Brown, noted that two examples of technical violations
are when "officers in good faith arrest an individual in reliance on a warrant later invalidated or
pursuant to a statute that subsequently is declared unconstitutional." Id. at 611 (footnote
omitted).
'1 Id. at 612 (Powell, J., concurring).
74Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 447 (1974).
75 284 S.E.2d at 370.
7' "[N]or shall any person, in any criminal case, be compelled to be a witness against himself,
or to be twice put in jeopardy of life or liberty for the same offence." W. VA. CONsT. art. III, § 5.
7 When a defendant challenges his conviction by appeal or by post-verdict motion, he waives
his right to be free from double jeopardy. State ex rel. Kincaid v. Spillers, 268 S.E.2d 137, 141 (W.
Va. 1980).
718 284 S.E.2d at 370.
79 Id.
80 Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1 (1978); State v. Frazier, 252 S.E.2d 39 (W. Va. 1979).
81 Frazier, 252 S.E.2d at 51 (quoting Burks, 437 U.S. at 15).
82 Frazier, 252 S.E.2d at 53.
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tion of evidentiary insufficiency must be "made upon the entire record submit-
ted to the jury and not upon the residual evidence remaining after the appel-
late court reviews the record for evidentiary error. 83 After making such a
review, the Stdnley court determined that the record did not reveal eviden-
tiary insufficiency and therefore a remand for a new trial on the basis of trial
error would not infringe upon Stanley's right not to be subjected to double
jeopardy.
V. CONCLUSION
The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals has extended the protec-
tions afforded the individual in his confrontation with the law. By excluding
evidence obtained from the exploitation of an extensive investigatory deten-
tion, the court in Stanley has correctly utilized the fourth amendment exclu-
sionary sanction. Additionally, the court has reaffirmed two of its prior hold-
ings. First, the giving of Miranda warnings is not enough to break the causal
connection between an illegal arrest and a confession. Also, a second trial will
not violate the double jeopardy clause if reversal is for trial error rather than
for evidentiary insufficiency. The determination of evidentiary insufficiency
must be made upon the entire record submitted to the jury.
The impact of Stanley will be felt by the state's law enforcement officers.
Clearly, a person cannot be detained beyond a very limited period of time
without probable cause,8' and any statements made during such a detention
will be excluded at trial.
In applying the exclusionary sanction, the facts of each case should be
studied to determine whether application of the rule will further the rule's
twin purposes of deterring investigatory misconduct and preserving judicial in-
tegrity. As Justice Powell reasoned in Brown, technical violations of the fourth
amendment and flagrantly abusive conduct should trigger significantly differ-
ent judicial responses. 5 A clear showing of a lack of causation should be re-
quired for any evidence obtained when prior official conduct was flagrantly
abusive of fourth amendment rights. On the other hand, the deterrent pur-
poses of the rule will not be served if the violations are merely technical ones.86
83 284 S.E.2d at 368, syl. pt. 3 (quoting Frazier, 252 S.E.2d at 53). The court in Frazier based
this holding upon the Supreme Court's decision in Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1 (1978), which
noted that the prosecution cannot complain, when upon all of the evidence "submitted to the
jury," an appellate court concludes that such evidence was insufficient to warrant a jury conviction.
Id. at 16. Recognizing the Supreme Court's emphasis on the initial failure of the prosecutor to
muster evidence in its first proceeding, the West Virginia court reasoned that the focus is on the
evidence introduced at trial and not on what is left after the appellate court completes its review.
Frazier, 252 S.E.2d at 53. See Case Comment, State v. Frazier, 82 W. VA. L. REv. 703 (1980).
84 Courts have held various lengths of time to be seizures. E.g., Dunaway v. New York, 442
U.S. 200 (1979) (one hour); United States v. Webb, 480 F. Supp. 750 (E.D.N.Y. 1979) (four hours);
United States v. Chamberlin, 609 F.2d 1318 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 3148 (1981) (20
minutes).
Brown, 422 U.S. at 610.
8' Courts in other jurisdictions have utilized Justice Powell's approach in examining fourth
amendment violations. E.g., United States v. O'Looney, 544 F.2d 385 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 429
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In West Virginia, it remains to be seen whether the court will consider the
purpose and flagrancy of police misconduct. If an illegal arrest in a future case
is based only upon a technical violation, the court should properly weigh this
factor in its decision.
Rebecca L. Stepto
U.S. 1023 (1976) (Police had a wellfounded reasonable suspicion approaching probable cause to
believe that the defendant had committed a crime. There were neither drawn guns nor police
actions calculated to cause surprise, fear or confusion.); Commonwealth v. Sylvia, 1980 Mass. Adv.
Sh. 749, 402 N.E.2d 489 (The arrest, effected at the reasonable hour of 8:30 a.m., was not designed
to cause surprise, fear or confusion; the police acted in good faith under a defective warrant).
Several legal scholars predict that the United States Supreme Court will permit a "good faith"
exception to the exclusionary rule. Over the protests of Justices Stevens, Brennan, and Marshall,
the Court announced in December, 1982, that it will rehear an Illinois search and seizure case
presenting such an issue. Illinois v. Gates, 103 S. Ct. 436 (U.S. 1982). The Court requested that the
parties address the issue of whether the exclusionary rule should be modified "so as, for example,
not to require the exclusion of evidence obtained in the reasonable belief that the search and
seizure at issue was consistent with the Fourth Amendment." The National Law Journal, Dec. 13,
1982, at 5, col. 1.
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